1.
Summary
Political
globalization has been much discussed in the globalization literature.
Political globalization, we argue, can be understood as a tension between three
processes which interact to produce the complex field of global politics:
global geopolitics, global normative culture and polycentric networks.
There can be little
doubt that one of the most pervasive forms of political globalization is the
worldwide spread of democracy based on the parliamentary nationstate.
Democratic government exists in some form in most parts of the world and where
it does not, as in China, there is a considerable demand for it by democratic
movements. This is a territorially based kind of globalization and largely
confined to the political form of the nation-state. after 1991, democracy has
become the universally acceptable form of government. In this sense then,
globalization does not undermine the democratic nation-state but gives it
worldwide acceptability. democratic nation-state in many parts of the world has
given rise to very different kinds of political cultures. The globalization of
democratic politics has been the basis of the so-called ‘new world order’.
Thus, the first
dimension of political globalization is the geopolitics of global power. A
second dimension of political globalization refers to the rise of a global
normative culture. One of the main expressions of this is human rights, it also
includes environmental concerns. Political communication is now also global in
scope, no longer confined to national borders.
Global civil
society, for example, is not separate from geopolitics, but occupies a separate
space beyond the state and global market. It exists alongside the state and has
been consequential in influencing global geopolitics in the direction of
multilateralism and global solidarity. Assumption: political globalization is
not leading in the direction of a new global order of governance or world
society but to transnational political action which challenges neoliberal
politics.
States continue to
be powerful actors but exist in a more globally connected world that they do
not fully control (see Sorensen 2004). According to Susan Strange (1996), in
the most well-known formulation of this position, states have been usurped by
global markets. With the transition from a world economy dominated by national
economies to a global economy new economic forces come into play challenging
the power of the nation-state.
According to Majone
(1996) the transnationalization of the state in Europe is best seen in terms of
a regulatory kind of governance rather than the creation of a new state system
that challenges the nation-state. The European Union possesses a large number
of independent regulatory authorities, working in fi elds such as the
environment, drugs and drug addiction, vocational training, health and safety at
work, the internal market, racism and xenophobia, food safety, aviation safety.
States have always had regulatory functions; what is different today is simply
these functions are being performed at a transnational level through
cooperation with other states. . The nation-state does not ‘wither away’ but becomes transformed by becoming a functional component of this
transnational apparatus and a major agent of global capitalism. In this
analysis, globalization reconfigures the state around global capitalism, making
it impossible for nationstates to be independent.
Communication is
central to politics. Most nation-states have been based on a national language,
which was increasingly standardized over time. In addition, political parties
have been at the centre of large-scale apparatuses of political communication
which they have used for social influence. If the Enlightenment public was
based on alleged free discussion, the public today is based on professional
political communication and mass persuasion through systematic advertising and
lobbying: for Mayhew this amounts to a‘new public’
(Mayhew 1997). However, as argued by Habermas (1989), communication is an open
site of political and cultural contestation and is never fully
institutionalized by the state or entirely controlled by elites and their
organs of political communication. The public sphere is the site of politics;
it is not merely a spatial location but a process of discursive contestation
(see Calhoun 1992; Crossley and Roberts 2004).
While debates continue
on the question of the global public sphere as a transnational space, what is
more important is the emergence of a global public discourse, which is less a
spatially defi ned entity than a manifestation of discourse (Delanty 2006). The
global public is the always ever present sphere of discourse that
contextualizes political communication and public discourse today.
Individual, and the
new transnational or global communities, networks and publics which have come
into existence and which are in turn driving new forms of politics. Central to
understanding these developments is the idea of civil society which perhaps
more than any other development has come to symbolize the political potential
of globalization, and signals the onset of globalization from below. The ‘civil societalization’ of politics both reinforces the idea that politics is increasingly
informed by a normative global culture and points to the transformation of the
nation-state as a site of political struggle.
In short, the growth
of global civil society is the result of increasing opportunities for
interaction between domestic and international politics. It is not adequate to
view global civil society as an aggregate of previously existing national civil
societies: global civil society is founded upon a non-territorial political
imaginary.
The image of a ‘borderless world’ has long been associated with thinking about globalization. We are
increasingly conscious of the shrinking dimensions or compression of an
increasingly interconnected world and the way in which this renders the globe
meaningful and brings it within the grasp of all individuals.
For Castells, the
advent of network society signals the decline of industrial society, the former
relying on a space of flows, the latter on a space of places. The second
dynamic is best represented by Beck’s (2002) idea of ‘cosmopolitanization’ or ‘globalization from within societies’. Beck emphasizes that the nature of state and society is undergoing
change as a result of globalization and that inside/outside, and
domestic/foreign assume new meanings. The globe can be experienced as a single
political space which can be the focus of political attachments and identities,
communities of interest, and can form a sphere of action. For many, the world
is a single place and political activity and individual consciousness are increasing.
Political
globalization has resulted in a new set of tensions around which politics is
now structured. Whereas key political conflicts were previously centred on
class divisions, state versus civil society, cleavages between traditional and
industrial economies or resistance to imperial rule, supplementary
contestations have arisen around a changed set of concerns: the right to
difference, individual versus community, liberal democracy versus
cosmopolitanism. Indeed, political globalization
has worked to create
the possibility for a proliferation of sites of political conflict around an
expanded set of concerns: governance, identity, mobilities and community
prominent amongst them.
1.
Summary
Political
globalization has been much discussed in the globalization literature.
Political globalization, we argue, can be understood as a tension between three
processes which interact to produce the complex field of global politics:
global geopolitics, global normative culture and polycentric networks.
There can be little
doubt that one of the most pervasive forms of political globalization is the
worldwide spread of democracy based on the parliamentary nationstate.
Democratic government exists in some form in most parts of the world and where
it does not, as in China, there is a considerable demand for it by democratic
movements. This is a territorially based kind of globalization and largely
confined to the political form of the nation-state. after 1991, democracy has
become the universally acceptable form of government. In this sense then,
globalization does not undermine the democratic nation-state but gives it
worldwide acceptability. democratic nation-state in many parts of the world has
given rise to very different kinds of political cultures. The globalization of
democratic politics has been the basis of the so-called ‘new world order’.
Thus, the first
dimension of political globalization is the geopolitics of global power. A
second dimension of political globalization refers to the rise of a global
normative culture. One of the main expressions of this is human rights, it also
includes environmental concerns. Political communication is now also global in
scope, no longer confined to national borders.
Global civil
society, for example, is not separate from geopolitics, but occupies a separate
space beyond the state and global market. It exists alongside the state and has
been consequential in influencing global geopolitics in the direction of
multilateralism and global solidarity. Assumption: political globalization is
not leading in the direction of a new global order of governance or world
society but to transnational political action which challenges neoliberal
politics.
States continue to
be powerful actors but exist in a more globally connected world that they do
not fully control (see Sorensen 2004). According to Susan Strange (1996), in
the most well-known formulation of this position, states have been usurped by
global markets. With the transition from a world economy dominated by national
economies to a global economy new economic forces come into play challenging
the power of the nation-state.
According to Majone
(1996) the transnationalization of the state in Europe is best seen in terms of
a regulatory kind of governance rather than the creation of a new state system
that challenges the nation-state. The European Union possesses a large number
of independent regulatory authorities, working in fi elds such as the
environment, drugs and drug addiction, vocational training, health and safety at
work, the internal market, racism and xenophobia, food safety, aviation safety.
States have always had regulatory functions; what is different today is simply
these functions are being performed at a transnational level through
cooperation with other states. . The nation-state does not ‘wither away’ but becomes transformed by becoming a functional component of this
transnational apparatus and a major agent of global capitalism. In this
analysis, globalization reconfigures the state around global capitalism, making
it impossible for nationstates to be independent.
Communication is
central to politics. Most nation-states have been based on a national language,
which was increasingly standardized over time. In addition, political parties
have been at the centre of large-scale apparatuses of political communication
which they have used for social influence. If the Enlightenment public was
based on alleged free discussion, the public today is based on professional
political communication and mass persuasion through systematic advertising and
lobbying: for Mayhew this amounts to a‘new public’
(Mayhew 1997). However, as argued by Habermas (1989), communication is an open
site of political and cultural contestation and is never fully
institutionalized by the state or entirely controlled by elites and their
organs of political communication. The public sphere is the site of politics;
it is not merely a spatial location but a process of discursive contestation
(see Calhoun 1992; Crossley and Roberts 2004).
While debates continue
on the question of the global public sphere as a transnational space, what is
more important is the emergence of a global public discourse, which is less a
spatially defi ned entity than a manifestation of discourse (Delanty 2006). The
global public is the always ever present sphere of discourse that
contextualizes political communication and public discourse today.
Individual, and the
new transnational or global communities, networks and publics which have come
into existence and which are in turn driving new forms of politics. Central to
understanding these developments is the idea of civil society which perhaps
more than any other development has come to symbolize the political potential
of globalization, and signals the onset of globalization from below. The ‘civil societalization’ of politics both reinforces the idea that politics is increasingly
informed by a normative global culture and points to the transformation of the
nation-state as a site of political struggle.
In short, the growth
of global civil society is the result of increasing opportunities for
interaction between domestic and international politics. It is not adequate to
view global civil society as an aggregate of previously existing national civil
societies: global civil society is founded upon a non-territorial political
imaginary.
The image of a ‘borderless world’ has long been associated with thinking about globalization. We are
increasingly conscious of the shrinking dimensions or compression of an
increasingly interconnected world and the way in which this renders the globe
meaningful and brings it within the grasp of all individuals.
For Castells, the
advent of network society signals the decline of industrial society, the former
relying on a space of flows, the latter on a space of places. The second
dynamic is best represented by Beck’s (2002) idea of ‘cosmopolitanization’ or ‘globalization from within societies’. Beck emphasizes that the nature of state and society is undergoing
change as a result of globalization and that inside/outside, and
domestic/foreign assume new meanings. The globe can be experienced as a single
political space which can be the focus of political attachments and identities,
communities of interest, and can form a sphere of action. For many, the world
is a single place and political activity and individual consciousness are increasing.
Political
globalization has resulted in a new set of tensions around which politics is
now structured. Whereas key political conflicts were previously centred on
class divisions, state versus civil society, cleavages between traditional and
industrial economies or resistance to imperial rule, supplementary
contestations have arisen around a changed set of concerns: the right to
difference, individual versus community, liberal democracy versus
cosmopolitanism. Indeed, political globalization
has worked to create
the possibility for a proliferation of sites of political conflict around an
expanded set of concerns: governance, identity, mobilities and community
prominent amongst them.
2. Interesting point
Previously, the biggest feature of
globalization was that globalization centered on trade. However, the biggest
characteristic of globalization nowadays is that globalizaiton connects trade,
production, investment and finance. In addition, the degree of integration of
labor, services and culture has become unprecedented. In other words, the
difference in economic integration is greater than in the past. The other side
is that there is a certain ideological base in the current globalization.
A number of side
effects have arisen as a result of this integration. A typical side effect is
inequality. In particular, relative inequality is becoming a big problem. It is
because there is also a question of how to measure inequality. In the small
part, we need to distinguish whether the problems are domestic or
international.
3. Discussion
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